Blockchains are distributed secure ledgers to which transactions are issued continuously and each block is tightly coupled to its predecessors. Permissioned blockchains place special emphasis on transactions throughput. In this paper we present TOY, which leverages the iterative nature of blockchains in order to improve their throughput in optimistic execution scenarios. TOY trades latency for throughput in the sense that in TOY the last f + 1 blocks of each node's blockchain are considered tentative, i.e., they may be rescinded in case one of the last f + 1 blocks proposers was Byzantine. Yet, when optimistic assumptions are met, a new block is decided in each communication step, which consists of a proposer that sends only its proposal and all other participants are sending a single bit each. Our performance study demonstrates that in a single Amazon data-center, TOY running on 10 nodes obtains a throughput of above 100K transactions per second for (typical Bitcoin size) 512 bytes transactions. In a 10 nodes Amazon geo-distributed setting with 512 bytes transactions, TOY obtains a throughput of 8K transactions per second.
I. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is a distributed secured replicated ledger service designed for environments in which not all nodes can be trusted [54] . More specifically, a blockchain maintains a distributed ordered list of blocks (the "chain") in which every block contains a sequence of transactions as well as authentication data about the previous blocks; the latter typically relies on cryptographic methods. Hence, any attempt to modify part of the blockchain can be detected, which helps to ensure the stability and finality of blockchain prefixes. Notice that transactions may in fact be any deterministic computational step, including the execution of smart contracts code. A primary challenge in implementing a blockchain abstraction is deciding on the order in which transactions are added into blocks and the order in which blocks are ordered in the chain.
Largely speaking, blockchains can be characterized as either unpermissioned or permissioned. In unpermis-This work was partially funded by ISF grant #1505/16. sioned blockchains, any computational node is allowed to participate in the computational task of deciding on the ordering of transactions and blocks as well as in the task of maintaining the blockchain's state [36] , [54] . In such an environment, there can be no trust between nodes and in fact with crypto-currencies participants have an apriori incentive to cheat. This implies utilizing significant cryptographic mechanisms to compensate for this zero trust model, which limits the throughput of the system.
In contrast, in permissioned mode, the blockchain is executed among a set of n known participants under the assumption that at most f of them are faulty [22] . For example, consider a consortium of insurance companies each donating a node in order to maintain a common blockchain of insurance policies and insurance claims. In this settings, blockchain becomes a special case of traditional replication state machine (RSM) [46] , [59] . A common approach to implementing RSM is by repeatedly running a consensus protocol to decide on the next transaction to be executed [47] with the common optimization of batching multiple transactions in each invocation of the consensus protocol [39] .
The assumed possible types of failures affects the type of consensus protocols that are used. Benign failures such as process(or) crash and occasional message omission can be overcome by benign consensus protocols, e.g., [25] , [42] , [48] , [55] . On the other hand, Byzantine failures [49] in which a faulty process may arbitrarily deviate from its code require Byzantine fault tolerant protocols (BFT), e.g., [16] , [23] , [44] . The type of failures along with the synchrony assumptions about the environment in which the blockchain is implemented impact the minimal ratio between f and n required to enable a solution to the problem. For example, assuming a synchronous environment, benign consensus requires f < n while Byzantine consensus requires f < n/2 in the signed messages model and f < n/3 in the oral messages model [49] . In the totally asynchronous case, the seminal FLP result showed that even benign consensus cannot be solved [37] . Yet, when enriching the environment with some minimal eventual synchrony assumptions, e.g., partial synchrony [32] , [34] , or with unreliable failure detector oracles [26] , benign consensus becomes solvable when f < n/2 and Byzantine consensus requires f < n/3. This is as long as the network does not become partitioned [18] .
In this paper, we focus on permissioned blockchains assuming Byzantine failures and partial synchrony. As mentioned above, most solutions in this domain involve repeatedly invoking a consensus instance in order to decide on the next transaction or batch of transactions [28] , [47] . This is vulnerable to performance attacks, as been identified in [13] , many of which can be ameliorated by rotating the role of the consensus initial proposer on each invocation of the protocol [13] , [27] , [62] .
A large fraction of the above works try to optimize performance in the "common case" in which there are no failures and the network behaves in a synchronous manner. These situations are likely to be common in permissioned blockchains, e.g., executed between major financial institutions, established business partners, etc. Yet, all the above mentioned works run each protocol instance for completion. Alas, we claim that in a production blockchain system, where transactions are being submitted continuously for as long as the service exists, there is potential for reducing the per transaction and per block communication overhead. This is by assuming optimistically that the initial proposer of each consensus invocation is correct, and only performing a recovery phase periodically for a batch of affected consensus invocations and only if it is needed. Our work investigates this approach and develops the TOY protocol to demonstrate its feasibility.
Our contributions: We propose TOY, a new communication frugal optimistic permissioned blockchain protocol. TOY utilizes the rotating proposer scheme while optimistically assuming that the proposer is correct and that the environment behaves synchronously. If these assumptions are violated, we do not insist on enforcing agreement immediately. Instead, we rely on the fact that at least one out of every f +1 proposers is correct. When a correct node discovers, using blockchain's authentication data, that any of the last f + 1 blocks (including the current one) was not decided correctly in the initial transmission phase, it runs a combined recovery phase for all these incorrectly executed invocations. This is by invoking a full Byzantine consensus protocol. At the end of this combined recovery phase, it is ensured that the current prefix of the blockchain is agreed by all correct nodes and will never change as long as there are at most f Byzantine failures. A single recovery phase may decide the last f blocks, amortizing its cost among them.
The main benefit of our approach is that when the optimistic assumption hold, the communication overhead of deciding on a block involves a single proposer broadcasting its block and all other nodes broadcasting a single bit of protocol data plus a round sequence number. Further, a new block is being decided in each communication step. This is by leveraging the iterative nature of blockchain as well as the authentication data that is associated with each block header.
The price paid by our algorithm is that finality of a decision is postponed for f + 1 invocations (or blocks). That is, we trade bandwidth and throughput for latency of termination. As we show when evaluating the performance of our protocol, the average termination latency of transactions from the point of view of clients is only a few seconds. This latency includes the round-trip latency from the client to the nodes as well as the time until the transaction becomes definitive, i.e., it is included in a block whose depth is at least f + 1. In return, when running on non-dedicated (physical) machines and network in a single Amazon data-center we demonstrate performance of 100K transactions per seconds. In a nondedicated multi data-center settings, we obtain at least 8K transactions per second. In both cases, the throughput is roughly 80% of the network's bandwidth.
II. RELATED WORK a) Optimistic Consensus: Two main methods were suggested for designing an optimistic consensus protocol: (i) satisfying safety from the nodes' point of view [38] , [45] , [51] or (ii) satisfying safety only from the clients' point of view [12] , [16] , [44] . In the first approach, in order to detect inconsistencies, nodes must continuously update other nodes with their state (the exception is [38] that uses randomization). In the second approach, nodes are allowed to be temporarily inconsistent with each other. Only when a client detects an inconsistency, e.g., by receiving inconsistent replies, it initiates a special recovery mechanism to restore the system's consistency. Concerning blockchains, the first method ignores blockchain's unique features that might be leveraged. However, running the blockchain nodes as clients of an agreement service results in at least two communication steps protocol even in the "good cases". b) Blockchain Systems: To circumvent FLP [37] , most unpermissioned blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin [54] , Ethereum [36] and Algorand [40] assume a synchronous network, signed messages and a Sybil prevention mechanism. Bitcoin and the current implementation of Ethereum rely on Proof-of-Work (PoW) while Algorand employs Proof-of-Stake (PoS). In both cases, the algorithm produces a new block in every time slot whose length depends on the worst case maximal network's latency and block size. When the synchrony assumption is violated, safety might be violated as well, resulting in more than one version of the chain that exist concurrently, also known as a fork in the chain. To overcome forks the platform assumes an upper bound on the computation resources that are held by malicious nodes (less than 50%) and defines a deterministic rule in which a node always prefers the longest chain it knows about. Although with PoS the chain may fork with a probability that is less than one in a trillion, with PoW, forks may happen frequently. Hence, PoW and the above recovery mechanism impose another crucial drawback: a transaction is never permanent since a longer version may always emerge in the future (although with rapidly diminishing probability). Thus, clients cannot rely on a new block until it is deep enough in the chain, resulting in high latency even in the common case. PoS improves the performance w.r.t. PoW, but results in very complicated protocols.
Permissioned blockchain protocols typically assume a partially synchronous network while utilizing traditional BFT concepts. Such platforms run a more computationally efficient protocol but require an a-priori PKI infrastructure. Traditional BFT solutions are not scalable in the number of participants [63] as their communication complexity grows quadratically in the number of nodes. Hence, such solutions focus on (i) sharding the execution's roles between multiple layers, leaving the consensus to be run by a small set of nodes, and on (ii) designing optimized dedicated BFT consensus protocols. Known platforms like HLF [3], [5] , [14] , [61] and R3 Corda [2] offer new models of layered computation and run the bft-SMaRt [17] protocol, or a variants of it, as an ordering service layer. HLF runs the three phases model of execute-order-validate. R3 Corda maintains a hashed directed acyclic graph named Hash-DAG (rather than a single chain), in which a transaction is stored only by those nodes who are effected by it. To ensure transactions' validity Corda offers a bft-SMaRt based distributed notary service.
On the other hand, platforms such as Chain Core [1], Iroha [6] , Symboint-Assembly [9] , Tendermint [10], and Chain Core [24] offer new optimized BFT Consensus algorithms. Iroha, inspired by the original HLF (v0.6) architecture, runs the Sumeragi consensus protocol which is heavily inspired by BChain [33] . BChain is a Chain replication system in which n nodes are linearly arranged and a transaction is moved among the nodes in a chain topology. Namely, each node normally receives a message only from its predecessor. Like TOY, BChain trades latency for throughput and it has the potential to achieve the best possible throughout [16] , [41] . Unlike TOY, BChain's latency is bounded by at least n rounds. Symboint-Assembly implements its own variant of bft-SMaRt. Tendermint implements an iterative variant of PBFT [23] designed by Buchman et el. [21] . Chain Core runs the Federated consensus protocol in which one node is the leader and n are validators. This protocol is Byzantine resilient for f < n 3 only as long the leader is correct. Red Belly blockchain [8] offers both a new computation model that balances the verification load among verifies nodes and the Democratic BFT consensus [30] that is able to scale the throughput with the number of proposers. Finally, HoneyBadger BFT (HBB) [52] , [4] is a randomized protocol targeting blockchain. HBB circumvents FLP by randomization and is based on a probabilistic binary Byzantine consensus [53] .
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. System model
We consider an asynchronous fully connected environment consisting of n nodes out of which at most f < n 3 may incur Byzantine failures [15] , [56] . Asynchronous means that no upper bound on the messages' transfer delays exists and nodes have no access to a global clock. While nodes may have access to local clocks, these clocks might not be synchronized with each other and may advance at different rates. Fully connected means that any two nodes are connected via a reliable link. Reliable means that a link does not lose, modify or duplicate a sent message. Notice that unreliable fair lossy links can be transformed into reliable ones using sequence numbering, retransmissions, and error detection codes [58] . A Byzantine failure means that a node might deviate arbitrarily w.r.t. its protocol code including, e.g., sending arbitrary messages, sending messages with different values to different nodes, or failing to send any or all messages. Yet, we assume that nodes cannot impersonate each other. A node suffering from a Byzantine failure at any point during its operation is called Byzantine; otherwise, it is said to be correct.
As proved in the FLP result [37] , consensus is unsolvable in a truly asynchronous system. In order to circumvent FLP, we enrich the system with the ♦Synch assumption [19] . ♦Synch means that after an unknown time τ there is an unknown upper bound δ on a message's transfer delay. As in most Byzantine fault tolerance works [16] , [23] , [44] , ♦Synch is only needed to ensure liveness, meaning that even under severe network delays safety is never violated. Finally, a node may sign a message by an unforgeable signature. We denote the signature of node p on message m by sig p (m). The implementation of the signature mechanism is done by a well known cryptographic technique, such as symmetric chippers [35] , RSA [57] or an elliptic curves digital signature (ECDS) [43] .
B. Underlying Protocols
Solutions to the following fundamental distributed computing problems serve as building blocks for TOY.
Reliable Broadcast (RB): The reliable broadcast abstraction [20] (denoted RB-Broadcast) ensures reliable message delivery in the presence of Byzantine failures. To utilize RB-Broadcast nodes may invoke two methods: RB-broadcast and RB-deliver. A correct node that wishes to broadcast a message m invokes RB-broadcast(m) while a node that expects to receive a message invokes RB-deliver. By a slight abuse of notation, we denote RB-deliver(m) the fact than an invocation of RB-deliver returned the message m and say that the invoking process has RB-delivered m. The RB-Broadcast abstraction satisfies the following properties: RB-Validity: If a correct node has RB-delivered a message m from a correct node p, then p has invoked RB-broadcast(m). RB-Agreement: If a correct node RB-delivers a message m, then all correct nodes eventually RB-deliver m. RB-Termination: If a correct node invokes RBbroadcast(m), then all correct nodes eventually RBdeliver m. Atomic Broadcast (AB): The atomic broadcast abstraction [31] is more restrictive than RB-Broadcast in the sense that in addition to the RB-Broadcast properties it requires the Order property as well. Atomic-Order: All messages delivered by correct nodes are delivered in the same order by all correct nodes.
Multi-value Byzantine Consensus: As mentioned above, most implementations of atomic broadcast rely on consensus protocols as sub-routines. In our context, Multi-value Byzantine Consensus (MVC) [49] is a variant of the consensus problem in which a set of nodes, each potentially proposing its own value, must decide on the same value in a decentralized network despite the presence of Byzantine failures. A solution to the MVC problem satisfies the following properties [34] : MVC-Validity: If all correct nodes have proposed the same value v, then v must be decided. MVC-Agreement: No two correct nodes decide differently.
MVC-Termination:
Each correct node eventually decides. Notice that according to MVC-Validity, any decision is valid when not all correct nodes propose the same value. Hence, it is not helpful when the system begins in a non agreement state, which is common in real systems. To that end, an extended validity property was suggested in [28] and is composed of three sub-properties: MVC1-Validity: If all correct nodes have proposed the same value v, then v must be decided. 
C. Leveraging Blockchain's Iterativity
Blockchain algorithms require an external validity mechanism as sometimes even Byzantine nodes may propose legal values (or blocks) [50] . Therefore, the validity of a value may be defined by an external predefined method. The Predicate-based Validity Byzantine Consensus (VPBC) [30] abstraction captures this observation by defining the following validity property: VPBC-Validity: A decided value satisfies an external predefined VALID method. VPBC-Agreement and VPBC-Termination are the same as their MVC/BBC counterparts. That is, VPBC generalizes the classical definition of MVC.
Iterative Validity Predicated-based Consensus: In order to leverage the iterative nature of blockchains, we define a weaker model than VPBC in which we denote each iteration with a round number r. Next, we define the following per round notions: Tentative decision: A decision of the protocol at a given node and round that might still be changed.
Definite decision:
A decision of the protocol at a given node and round that will never be change v r p : A value that was decided or received by p in round r of the protocol. v r denotes a value that was decided or received by some node in round r d(v r p ): Let r be the current round of the protocol that node p runs. For a given v r p (possible tentative), we denote its depth as d(v r p ) = r − r Let VALID be a predefined method as in VPBC and let ρ be a predefined fixed constant. The ρ-Iterative Validity Predicated-based Consensus (IVPC(ρ)) abstraction defines the following properties: IVPC-Validity: A decided (possible tentative) value v satisfies the VALID method. IVPC-Agreement: For any two correct nodes p, q,
IVPC-Termination(1): Every round eventually termi-
nates. (2): In every round r > r + ρ, v r p is definite. IVPC guarantees the VPBC's properties only for decisions that are at depth greater than ρ. With blockchains, as every block contains an authentication data regarding its predecessors, it provides a glimpse to its creator history. This additional information may assist in detecting failures without the necessity of sending additional information. In addition, blocks are continuously added to the chain. Thus, a block eventually becomes deep enough such that it satisfies the standard VPBC properties.
IVPC-Termination
IV. WEAK RELIABLE BROADCAST
A. Overview
We now present the Weak Reliable Broadcast (WRB) abstraction which serves as TOY's main message dissemination mechanism. WRB offers weaker agreement guarantees than RB-Broadcast [20] . In general, WRB ensures that the nodes agree on (i) the sender's identity and (ii) whether to deliver a message at all, rather than the content of the message. WRB is associated with the WRB-broadcast and WRB-deliver methods. A node that wishes to disseminate a message m invokes WRBbroadcast(m). If a node expects to receive a message m from k through this mechanism it invokes WRBdeliver(k). WRB-deliver(k) returns a message m where m is the received message. If the nodes were not able to deliver k's message, WRB-deliver(k) returns nil. Formally, WRB satisfies the following properties: WRB-Validity: If a correct node WRB-delivered(k) m = nil, then k has invoked WRB-broadcast(m).
Algorithm 1 Weak Reliable broadcast -code for p 1: timer ← timeout 2: procedure WRB-BROADCAST(m) 3: broadcast(m, sigp(m)) 4: procedure WRB-DELIVER(k) 5:
wait until a message m has been received from k ∨ timer expired 6:
if a message m with a valid signature has been received from k then 7:
d ← BBC.propose(1) 8: else 9:
d ← BBC.propose(0) 10:
if d = 1 ∧ m has been received from k then 11:
adjust timer 12:
return m 13:
increase timer 14:
if d = 1 then 15:
broadcast(REQ, k) 16:
else if d = 0 then 17:
return nil 18:
wait until a valid (m , sig k (m )) has been received from some node q 19:
return m 20: 21:
upon receiving (REQ, k) from p ∧ m has been received from k do: 22: send(m, sig k (m)) to p WRB-Agreement: If two correct nodes p, q WRBdelivered(k) m p , m q respectively from k, then m p , m q = nil. Namely, all correct nodes either deliver a message m = nil from k or they all deliver nil. WRB-Termination(1): If a correct node p WRBdeliver(k) m from k, then every correct node that is trying to WRB-deliver(k) eventually WRB-deliver(k) some message m from k. WRB-Termination(2): If a correct node k repeatedly invokes WRB-broadcast(m) then eventually all correct nodes will WRB-deliver(k) m.
B. Implementing WRB
The pseudo-code implementation of WRB is listed in Algorithm 1. To WRB-broadcast a message, a node simply broadcast it to everyone (line 3). When p invokes WRB-deliver(k) it performs the following:
• It waits for at most timer to receive a message from k (line 5). • If such a message has been received, then p votes to deliver it using a BBC protocol. Else, p votes against delivering the message from k (lines 6-9). • Assuming the decision is to deliver (BBC returned 1), if the message has already been received by p, then p returns it (lines 10-12). Else, since the BBC protocol decided 1, it means that at least one correct node was able to receive k's message and vote for its acceptance. Thus, p asks the other nodes to republish k's message (lines 14-15). • On obtaining a valid response to p's republish request, p returns the received message (lines [18] [19] . • If it was decided not to deliver the message, then p returns nil (lines [16] [17] . Also, upon receiving q's republishing request for k's message, if p has k's message m, it republishes m with m's signature (lines [21] [22] .
To ensure liveness, the timer is increased each time p does not receive the message (line 13). To avoid having too long timers for too long, timer might be adjusted downward when a message is received by p (line 11). The exact details of such adjustments are beyond the scope of this paper, but see for example [23] .
Note that in optimistic implementations of BBC each node broadcasts its vote to all other nodes [56] . Then if a node receives enough votes for the same value v to safely decide v after this single communication step, it decide v and returns. We assume the use of such an optimistic BBC protocol.
Piggybacking Over WRB-Deliver: In order for TOY to maintain its amortized one communication step per block we need TOY to be able to piggyback one of its message types on another message it WRB-delivers. The details appear in Section V-B below. To support this, we augment the WRB-deliver method to receive two parameters, i.e., WRB-deliver(k,pgd) such that pgd is the potential piggybacked data (can be nil). The BBC protocol is also augmented to receive pgd and piggyback it on the first message it broadcasts. Recall that we assume we utilize an optimistic BBC protocol that always start by having each node broadcast its vote. Hence in the augmented protocol, each node that starts the BBC protocol broadcasts its vote alongside the piggybacked pgd message, which is made available to the calling code together with the decision value.
C. WRB Correctness Proof
Lemma IV-C.1 (WRB-Validity). If a correct node p WRB-delivered(k) a message m = nil, then k has invoked WRB-broadcast(m).
Proof. The system model assumes reliable channels. Also, each node signs the messages it WRB-broadcasts. Hence, if a message m is received and pass validation as being sent by k, then k has indeed WRBbroadcast(m).
Lemma IV-C.2 (WRB-Agreement). If two correct nodes p, q WRB-delivered(k) m p , m q respectively from k, then m p , m q = nil. Namely, all correct nodes either deliver a message different than nil from k or they all deliver nil.
Proof. Let p, q be two correct nodes that have WRBdelivered(k) m p , m q respectively from k. Assume b.w.o.c and w.l.o.g that m p = nil while m q = nil. The only way a correct node returns nil is if BBC.propose returned 0. Respectively, the only way a correct node returns m = nil is if BBC.propose returned 1. This is in contradiction to BBC-Agreement. Hence, either m p , m q = nil or both p and q returns nil.
Lemma IV-C.3 (WRB-Termination[1]). If a correct node p WRB-deliver(k) m from k, then every correct node that is trying to WRB-deliver(k) eventually WRBdeliver(k) some message m from k.
Proof. Any correct node p waits for k's message at most timer time units, hence p eventually invokes BBC.propose. By BBC-Termination, no correct node is blocked forever on BBC.propose. If BBC.propose has returned 0 then p returns nil. Else, if k's message has been received by p it returns m. Otherwise, p asks from other nodes for k's message. By BBC-Validity, if BBC.propose returned some value v then at least one correct node q proposed v. If BBC.propose returned 1 it means that at lest one correct node q has proposed 1 and by the algorithm's code q do so if it has received k's message m. Hence, when q receives p request it sends back m. As q is correct it does not crash and p receives and returns m.
Lemma IV-C.4 (WRB-Termination [2] ). If a correct node k repeatedly invokes WRB-broadcast(m) then eventually all correct nodes will WRB-deliver(k) m.
Proof. By the algorithm's code, on any unsuccessful delivery the timer increases. Let k be a correct node that repeatedly invokes WRB-broadcast(m). Following the ♦Synch [19] assumption and the incremental timer method [23] , eventually after an unknown time τ the timer of all nodes is longer than the unknown upper bound δ on a message's transfer delay and so every correct node receives k's message and invokes BBC.propose(1). By BBC-Agreement if all correct nodes propose 1 then 1 has to be decided. Hence, every correct node eventually WRB-deliver(k) m.
By the above four lemmas we have:
Theorem IV-C.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1 solves WRB.
V. TOY -A TOTAL ORDERING OPTIMISTIC SYSTEM
We now present TOY, a Total ordering Optimistic sYstem, targeting blockchains. TOY implements the IVPC(ρ) abstraction with ρ = f + 1. This section focuses on the algorithmic aspects of TOY and its correctness, while actual implementation considerations and performance are discussed in Section VI below.
A. Overview
In the fault-free synchronized case, TOY decides on a new block in each communication step. Further, in each such step a single proposer sends its proposed block and all other nodes only send a single bit. In order to achieve these goals, TOY runs speculatively assuming that there are no failures and the network is synchronized. To that end, it employs a rotating proposer paradigm in which the proposer of each round advances in a cyclic manner in each round. The proposer simply broadcasts its proposed block.
Obviously, sometimes the optimistic assumptions do not hold. TOY separates between how it recovers from benign failures which cause one or more nodes to miss a message vs. how it handles non-benign failures that may cause different nodes to hold a diverging suffix of the blockchain. Yet, unlike most consensus based protocols, TOY does not try to mask neither type of failures in the round they occur.
In the case of benign failures, TOY settles for ensuring an all or nothing delivery semantics by relying on the WRB abstraction. Recall from Section IV that WRB is implemented by running a BBC instance on the message proposed in each round r. Specifically, each node p i at round r waits at most a given timeout δ j i for messages from a proposer p j . If it received the message, p i invokes the BBC protocol and votes for delivering p j 's message; otherwise, p i votes for skipping p j 's message. Yet, to avoid increasing the number of communication steps when the optimistic assumptions hold, we employ a BBC protocol that terminates in a single step when all nodes propose the same value, e.g., [16] , and overlap the first step of the BBC protocol of round r with the proposal of round r + 1. A new block is decided on each communication step, a single proposer broadcasts only its block, and all others broadcast a single bit. Further, if p i did not receive p j 's message in round r, it increases δ j i . Hence, given the ♦Sync assumption, eventually each round started by a non-Byzantine proposer results in all nodes accepting its proposed block 1 .
1 In practice, for optimal performance we can dynamically adjust δ j i based on timing statistics gathered over some recency window.
As for non-benign Byzantine failures, these may cause two correct nodes to initially accept two different block proposals in the same round r. This is why initially we define a block to be only tentatively decided. Due to the rotating proposer paradigm and the ratio between f and n, if two different blocks are tentatively decided in a round r, then at worst by round r + f there will be a round lead by a correct proposer, who will report the same blockchain's authentication data to all nodes. In that round nodes who discover that their blockchain history is different than the one reported by the proposer would initiate a recovery phase in which a full fledged PBFT protocol [23] is invoked to decide on the longest possible blockchain given the transactions the nodes already know about. Thus, the cost of the full fledged PBFT protocol is amortized among multiple blocks.
Given the above, it is clear that once a correct node reaches round r + f + 1, it knows that the prefix of its blockchain upto round r will never be changed, and therefore becomes definitely decided. That is, TOY provides IPVC(f + 1). Yet, in order to fulfill the IPVC(f + 1) properties, for reasons that will be clarified in Section V-B, the recovery mechanism is based on the following invariant:
Invariant 1. A node p proceeds to the next round of the algorithm only if it knows that at least f + 1 correct nodes will eventually proceed as well.
An immediate consequence of Invariant 1 is that if a block b r is at depth f + 1 in p's local chain, then there are at least f + 1 correct nodes for which b r is at depth of at least f + 1 in their local chains. In principle, preserving Invariant 1 requires waiting for an acknowledgements from at least f other correct nodes that they are moving to the next round. Yet, since the communication pattern we described above already includes an all-to-all message exchange in each round (while executing the optimistic BBC), it serves as an implicit acknowledgement, so still have a single message per round when the optimistic assumptions hold.
B. Detailed Description
The pseudocode of TOY is listed in Algorithm 2. During each round r, p i takes the following actions:
• First, p i identifies a proposer who did not successfully propose a block in the last f + 1 rounds (lines 5-6). This is done using a deterministic rule. Given the atomic order of TOY, it guarantees that all correct nodes choose the same proposer. • Next, if p i is r i 's proposer and the previous round was not under optimal conditions, then p i disseminates its block (lines 7-11).
Algorithm 2 TOY -code for p i 1:
while proposerr i 's block was tentatively decided in the last f rounds do 6:
proposerr i ← (proposerr i + 1) mod n 7:
if i = proposerr i ∧ round r i − 1 was not under optimal conditions then 8:
# Non optimistic scenario 9:
b ← prepared block 10:
WRB-broadcast(b) 11:
b ← nil 12:
if (proposerr i + 1) mod n = i then 13:
# Optimistic scenario 14:
b ← prepared block 15: b
proposerr i ← (proposerr i + 1) mod n 18:
RB-broadcast(proof) 22:
invoke RECOV ERY (r i , proof ) 23: continue 24:
append b
invoke RECOV ERY (r, proof ) 30: 31: procedure RECOVERY(r, proof) 32:
versionsr ← empty set 33:
if r i < r − 1 then 34:
v ← empty version 35:
37:
Atomic-broadcast(v) 38:
repeat Atomic-deliver v j from p j 39:
# Validating version 40:
if v j is valid then 41:
versionsr ← versionsr ∪ {v j } 42:
adopt v and update r i , and proposerr i • Similarly, if p i is supposed to be (r i +1)'s proposer, it prepares a block that is about to be piggybacked on the first message of WRB-deliver (lines 12-14). • Then, p i tries to WRB-deliver the block from r i 's proposer; If WRB-deliver returns nil, then p i continues to the next proposer and starts over. Else,WRBdeliver returned a block b ri i (lines 15-18). • If b ri i is valid, p i appends it to its chain and decides on the (r i − (f + 2)) th block (lines 24-26).
• If b ri i is not valid, it means that some non-benign Byzantine activity has occurred. Hence, p i RBbroadcast a proof that b ri i is invalid and invokes the recovery mechanism (lines 19-22). • Similarly, when p i RB-delivers from q a valid proof for b r q 's invalidity (recall that validity is verified against the predefined valid method and digital signatures), it invokes the recovery mechanism (lines 28-29).
The recovery procedure installs agreement among all correct nodes regarding the longest possible prefix of the blockchain. Executing RECOVERY by p i involves:
• p i proposes, using Atomic-broadcast, a valid version of the f blocks that are in disagreement (excluding b r itself) followed by all the newer blocks it knows about (lines 33-37). • Then p i collects n − f valid versions (including empty ones) and adopts the first longest agreed prefix of the blockchain (lines [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] .
Given the algorithm's code and Invariant 1, at any time there are at least f + 1 correct nodes such that their current round is the most advanced. We call this group the front of the algorithm. As p i waits until it receives n − f valid versions, at least one of them has been proposed by q ∈ front. Following the Atomic-Order property all correct nodes will adopt the very same version. Recall that a received version is valid if it satisfies the following: 1) the digital signatures are correct, 2) satisfies the predefined VALID method and 3) every f + 1 consecutive blocks were created by f + 1 different nodes.
Thus, f Byzantine nodes may propose a valid version in which the last f blocks are switched by f made up blocks that satisfy these three conditions. Yet, as long this version is valid with respect to the VALID method, there is no need to preclude it [50] . Figure 1 depicts a normal case operation for n = 4 and f = 1 where the system begins a synchronized period and no failures occur. In this "good period", all nodes are expected to receive b r and to act correctly. Hence, all nodes vote to receive b r , terminating BBC in a single communication step while preserving Invariant 1. In addition, piggybacking b r+1 on r's first WRB-deliver message ensures the desired communication goals.
C. Correctness Proof
Lemma V-C.1 (IVPC(f+1)-Validty). A decided (possible tentative) value v satisfies the VALID method. Proof. Following Algorithm 2's code, a value is appended to the blockchain only if it satisfies the VALID method.
Lemma V-C.2. Every f + 1 consecutive decided blocks were proposed by f + 1 different nodes.
Proof. By Algorithm 2's code (lines 5-6), if the current proposer has proposed a block that is still tentative it is switched to a new proposer. A tentative block means that its proposer successfully proposed it in the last f +1 rounds.
Lemma V-C.3. At the recovery procedure's end, all correct nodes adopt the same version.
Proof. By Atomic-Order all correct nodes receive the same versions in the same order. Hence, applying the deterministic rule described in Algorithm 2 results an agreement among the correct nodes.
Lemma V-C.4. For any two correct nodes p, q, let b r p , b r q be their decided value in round r. If d(b r p ) > f ∧d(b r q ) > f then b r p = b r q . Proof. Let p, q be two correct nodes and let b r p , b r q be their decided value in round r such that d(b r p ) > f ∧ d(b r q ) > f and assume b.w.o.c that b r p = b r q . Let p r be r's proposer. If p r is correct, then by WRB-Agreement and p r 's correctness all correct nodes have received the very same message from p r (as in Reliable Broadcast). Hence, the case of b r p = b r q may occur only as a result of the recovery procedure invocation in round r ∈ {r + 1, ..., r + f }. By Lemma V-C.3 at the end of the recovery procedure all the correct nodes agree on the same version. Hence, b r p = b r q , contrary to the assumption.
Assuming that p r is Byzantine and has disseminated different blocks to p and q. Then, by Lemma V-C.2 and the fact that the system model assumes at most f faulty nodes there is at least one block b r ∈ {b r+1 , ..., b r+f } that was proposed by correct proposer p r . Due to p r correctness it disseminates the same block to all, including the associated authentication data. Assume w.l.o.g that p r has received from p r the same version as p, then following Algorithm 2 (lines 19-22) q receives an invalid block from p r and invokes the recovery procedure. As q is correct and by RB-Termination p RB-delivers q's proof to b r q invalidity and triggers the recovery procedure. Following Lemma V-C.3 at the end of the recovery procedure all correct nodes adopt the very same version resulting that b r p = b r q , contrary to the assumption.
Lemma V-C.5 (IVPC(f+1)-Agreement). For any two correct nodes p, q, let b r p , b r q be their decided value in round r.
Lemma V-C.6. If during the recovery procedure for round r, a correct node p receives a version v from correct node q, then v is valid with respect to b
Proof. If the received version is an empty one, it is trivially valid with respect to b r−(f +2) p . Else, by Lemma V-C.4 all correct nodes agree on b r−(f +2) . As q is correct, by Lemma V-C.1 q appends only valid blocks to its blockchain. Hence, q's version (that starts with b
Definition V-C.2. Let r g be the most advanced round of the algorithm that any correct node runs. We define the group of nodes that their current round is ∈ {r g , r g − 1} by front = {p|r p ∈ {r g − 1, r g }}. Note that as long as Invariant 1 is kept, there are at least f + 1 correct nodes in front.
Lemma V-C.7. As long as Invariant 1 is kept, a correct node executing the recovery procedure receives n − f valid versions and at least one of them was received from a node in front.
Proof. By RB-Termination if a correct node p detects an invalid block and invokes the recovery procedure, eventually every correct node will receive p's proof and will invoke the recovery procedure. Following the system model, the ratio between n and f and Lemma V-C.6, a correct node does not get blocked while waiting for n − f valid versions (part of whom may be empty). By Invariant 1 p receives at least one version from a correct node in f ront.
Lemma V-C.8 (IVPC(f+1)-Termination(1)). Every round eventually terminates.
Proof. Let r be a round of the algorithm. Following WRB-Termination(1), WRB-Termination(2) and the algorithm's iterative nature every correct node eventually succeeds to WRB-deliver b r . If b r is valid and the recovery procedure has not been invoked, then naturally nothing prevents the round from terminating. If the recovery procedure has been invoked, then following Lemma V-C.7 every correct node eventually receives n−f valid versions and finishes the recovery procedure; in the worst case, such a node stays in round r − 1. The system model assumes at most f faulty nodes, which means that the above can repeat itself at most f times in a row. Hence, after at most f consecutive invocations of the recovery procedure, a correct proposer proposes b r , making r terminating in all correct nodes.
Definition V-C.3. Let r be a round of the algorithm, we define by front r = {p|r p > r + f + 1} the group of nodes whose current round is greater by at least f + 1 rounds than r.
Lemma V-C.9 (IVPC(f+1)-Termination (2) . In every round r > r + f + 1, v r p is definite. Proof. Following Algorithm 2's code, after a valid block was WRB-delivered, the only way it can be renewed is by an invocation of the recovery procedure. Obviously, front ⊆ front r . By Lemma V-C.5 ∀q, p ∈ front r , b r q = b r p . By Algorithm 2's code and Lemma V-C.7, if the recovery procedure has been invoked, then p adopts a prefix version that was suggested by q ∈ front. Thus, this version includes(valid with respect to) b r q which is identical to b r p .
Notice that due to asynchrony, it is possible that some node q ∈ front advances to round r +1 while other node p ∈ front invoked the recovery procedure for round r+1. In such a case, q may adopt a new blockchain prefix which was proposed by p and thus replace b
This edge case, illustrated in Figure 2 , is the reason why TOY implements IVPC(f+1) rather than IVPC(f).
The following theorem follows from Lemmas V-C.1, V-C.5, V-C.8 and V-C.9:
Theorem V-C.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 2 solves IVPC(f + 1). (f+1) , a node q may renew a definite block. While recovering, due to contention on b r q , the nodes may adopt a prefix that was suggested by p ∈ front while p is still in round r.
Lemma V-C.10 (Atomic Order). All blocks delivered by correct nodes using Algorithm 2 are delivered in the same order.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma V-C.5 and the iterative nature of the algorithm.
By Lemma V-C.10 and Theorem V-C.1, we have:
Theorem V-C.2. The protocol listed in Algorithm 2 impose a total order concerning the blocks. Table I summarizes the performance of TOY in each of its three modes. In the case of no failures and synchronized network, TOY performs a single all-toall communication step as well as one digital signature operation. Further, only one node broadcasts more than one bit. This can be obtained since the latency for a definitive decision can be up to f +1 rounds. We show in Section VI that this tradeoff is quite reasonable. In case a message is not received by WRB-deliver due to timing, omission or benign failures, the algorithm runs a full BBC instance as well as two more communication steps (one-to-all and one-to-one) in which a node asks for the missed message from the nodes who did receive it. Also, the amount of digital signature operations depends on the specific BBC implementation that is used by WRB-deliver. Finally, in the case of Byzantine failures, TOY runs the recovery procedure which depends on the Reliable Broadcast and the Atomic Broadcast implementations.
D. Theoretical Bounds and Performance
Note that one can trade additional communication steps for fewer digital signature operations by using signature-free implementation of TOY's based protocols, e.g, [53] , [38] , [29] . As TOY is inherently not signaturefree, a node may authenticate up to n−f received prefix versions. Yet, when Byzantine failures manifest, a node does not lose blocks so the latency in terms of rounds remains the same. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
A. TOY's Implementation Figure 3 depicts the main components of a single instance TOY's implementation. Using TOY's API one can feed the transactions pool with new write requests. Then, on its turn, the delivery thread creates a new block and WRB-Broadcast it. The WRB thread uses a speculative BBC. Meanwhile, the panic thread waits for an invocation of the recovery mechanism. When a panic message is RB-delivered, the panic thread interrupts the delivery thread which as a result invokes the recovery mechanism. Both Reliable Broadcast and Atomic Broadcast are natively implemented on top of bft-SMaRt. TOY is built using Java and the communication infrastructure is done on top of gRPC, excluding bft-SMaRt which has its own communication infrastructure.
B. TOP -A Toys Orchestrating Platform
While TOY assumes partial synchrony, its rotating leader pattern imposes synchronization in the sense that a node cannot propose a block before its turn, making TOY's throughput bounded by the actual network's latency. To ameliorate this problem, we introduce another level of abstraction, named workers, by which each node runs multiple instances of TOY and uses them as a blockchain based ordering service. The use of workers brings two benefits: (i) workers behave asynchronously to each other which compensates for the above synchrony effect of TOY and (ii) while a worker waits for a message, other workers are able to run, resulting in better CPU utilization. To preserve the overall total ordering property of TOY, the nodes must collect the results from the workers in a pre-defined order, e.g., round robin. This requirement may imposes higher latency when the system is heavily loaded because even if a single worker faces the non-optimistic case, it delays all other workers from delivering their blocks to the node. Figure 4 depicts an overview of a TOP node. Upon receiving an update request from a client, the client manager directs the request to the least loaded worker. Meanwhile, the node repeatedly pulls decided blocks from the workers (in a round-robin fashion) and adds them to its local blockchain replica. When a read request is received, the client manager reads from the local blockchain replica and answers the client accordingly.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our setup includes n nodes running on n identical VMs with the following specification: t2.xlarge instance with 4 vCPUs of Intel Broadwell E5-2686v4 2.3 GHz processor, 16 GiB memory and moderate network performance (as defined by Amazon). By using moderate VMs, we aim to show that even with common hardware TOP achieves results that match the need of the financial industry. Clients were run on t2.micro instance with 1 vCPU of Intel Xeon 2. {1, 2, 3, 16} . The second row describes the number of workers ranging between 1 to 20. The third row presents the transaction size starting with an empty transaction (50 Bytes is the size of a transaction metadata) and up to 4KB. The forth row presents the number of transactions in a block. The fifth row shows the tested timeout values.
9 machines, each of which running n clients. Hence, in total, each node served 9 clients that were running on different machines. 1) Signature generation: In TOP, as long as the optimistic assumption holds, the algorithm is bounded only by the network's performance (I/O bounded) and by the digital signature generation rate which are typically the most CPU intensive tasks (CPU bounded). The non-optimistic phase is bounded also by the timeout value (see Section IV-B) and bft-SMaRt's throughput. In particular, in the optimistic scenario of TOY, a proposer signs its block only once and any other node is verifying the signature only once. Hence, the maximal signature rate also serves as an upper bound on the potential throughput of TOY.
Following the above, we start by presenting an evaluation of the signatures generation rate. We use ECDSA signatures with the secp256k1 curve. When signing a block, all the block's transactions are hashed and the result is signed alongside the block header. We vary the β and σ values in the ranges described in Table II . As for the workers number, recall that our machines have only 4 vCPUs so we set ω ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. More precisely, denote by t hash the time that takes to hash a single byte. For a block consisting of β transactions of σ bytes each, the block's signing time, t sign , is expected to be
where C is a constant representing the time that takes to sign the fixed sized block header. We run the experiment 10 times, 1 minute each, and took the average. By the above we expect that the block size (in bytes) would have the primary impact on a block's signing time. Figure 5 depicts the benchmark results. It can be seen that with small blocks, in all configurations, the number of workers has a minor impact on the signatures generation rate. This can be explained by the fact that we use virtual CPUs (vCPUs): with small blocks the signing time is approximately C and thus the vCPUs are fully utilized even with a single thread. As expected, with bigger blocks (tens to hundreds KBs) the number of worker has a significant impact on the signatures generation rate. Notice that we did not designate a vCPU per thread. Hence, it can be seen that for ω ∈ {3, 4} and medium blocks (of tens KBs) the threads are struggling over the CPU, causing the performance to decrease. With bigger blocks, this impact does not occur due to the fact that signing a blocks takes much longer. Although with physical CPUs we may obtain different results, as long as our environment keeps using vCPUs, the results impose an upper bound on the transactions' throughput. Denote by throughput txs and throughput sig the transactions/second and signatures/second throughput respectively. The fol- lowing bound must hold:
throughput txs ≤ throughput sig · β
A. TOP Cluster in a Single Data-Center
We deployed a TOP cluster where all machines reside in the same data center. To test the system in extreme conditions we simulate an intensive load by filling every block to its maximal size. In practice, every node in its turn creates a new block and fills it with clients' requests. If the block is not full and the transactions pool is empty, the node fills the block, to its maximal capacity, with random transactions. a) TOP's Throughput: We tested TOP's throughput while varying the n, ω, σ and β values in the ranges described in Table II . Concerning τ , in this experiment we test the optimistic case only. Hence, we set τ = 2000 to ensure that it does not affect the throughput. For each configuration we run the experiment 3 times for a 1 minute each. The results were collected from all nodes and we took the average among them. Figure 6 shows TOP's throughput with the above configurations. Although σ = 50 is a degenerated scenario, it presents the potential of TOP if different design choices would have been taken (see VII-B). With σ = 50 and β = 1000, TOP achieves hundreds of thousands of transactions per second. Concerning real business settings, with σ = 512, which according to analyses [11] is the average size of a Bitcoin's transaction, TOP achieves over one hundred thousands transactions per seconds even with n = 10.
It can be observed that with any configuration the greatest ascend is from ω = 1 to ω ∈ {4, 5}. This is as expected since our machines have 4 vCPUs. Increasing ω beyond 10 results in negligible improvement in and β = 1000 and is about 90 MB/sec. To evaluate TOP's performance w.r.t the hardware bounds, we tested the network's performance between two machines in the same datacenter. We measured latency of 100 microseconds and bandwidth of 120 MB/sec. This means that TOP's throughput, in its peak, touches the network bounds. The experiment results demonstrate that TOP's throughput is in line with most envisioned blockchain applications. b) TOP's Latency: We tested TOP's latency with clients residing in the same data center. We focus on an "interesting" configuration in which σ = 512 bytes [11] . Tuning τ is important because with small τ TOY may run a full BBC and with long τ even a single worker that faces the non-optimistic scenario will delay all other workers by at least τ . Hence, we first tune τ . Figure 7 depicts τ 's tuning experiment. Denote by op b the number of blocks that were decided in an optimistic phase and by total b the overall number of decided blocks. We measured op b total b as a function of τ, ω, n and β. Note that each of the test parameters may affect the optimal timeout due to higher network latency, overloading the network, or even by competing for the CPU. The results enable us to configure an appropriate τ for every configuration, and to test TOP's latency. Setting ω = 1 demonstrates the power of TOY. Although TOY delays a definite decision for f + 1 rounds, from the point of view of the client the 90% latency is below one second. As for higher ω, we observe an increase in the latency with respect to higher n and β values. To understand the bottlenecks of the algorithm, we divide the execution on a node to multiple steps and measured how much time, on average, a block spends in each step. The steps we measured are: (i) signing a block, (ii) verifying a block, (iii) from proposing a block to tentatively deciding it, (iiii) from tentatively deciding a block to definitely deciding it, and (v) from a definite decision of a block to its delivery by TOP. Figure 9 shows the relative part of the execution time each block spends on average on each step. As shown, with ω = 1 a block spends most of its time waiting to be definitely decided while for higher ω it waits most of the time to be delivered by TOP. This phenomenon is easily explained: when multiple workers exists, they compete for the CPU and in addition a single worker that faces the non-optimistic scenario may delay all other workers. c) TOP's Scalability: Another important aspect of TOP/TOY is it's scalability. Most traditional consensus algorithms are hardly scalable [63] due to their threesteps communication pattern. In contrast, with TOY (and TOP), in the common case, in each communication step only one proposer broadcasts its proposal and all others a single bit. To test TOP's scalability, we run it with n = 49 (upto f = 16 faulty nodes). We took high τ = 20000 4 (1) 7 (1) 10 (1) 4 (5) 7 (5) 10 ( so that the nodes are unlikely to face the non optimistic scenario. For every configuration we run the experiment 3 times for 1 minute each. The results were collected from all nodes and we show the averages. Figure 10 depicts TOP's throughout with n = 49, ω ∈ {1, ..., 20}, σ = 512, β ∈ {100, 1000}, τ = 20000. It can be seen that even with a large number of nodes TOP achieves tens of thousands of transactions per second. d) TOP Under Failures: We tested TOP under two failure patterns: (i) a benign fault in which a node simply fails (denoted by F omission ) and (ii) a Byzantine fault in which a malicious node tries to split the chain by creating two versions among the nodes (denoted by F byz ). The price for running the single communication step pattern of TOY is that over long periods of failures, TOY handles failures with less efficiency than traditional algorithms. Hence, we aim to show that if failures do not last for long periods, then TOY's amortization method is reasonable. For that, we run TOP for 1 minute in which for 30 seconds TOP was facing failures. We repeated the experiment 3 times for each configuration. Figure 11 presents TOP under the two failure scenar- ios for varied configurations. It can be seen that even under failures, as long as they do not last for long, TOP still obtains good throughput. Setting ω = 1 demonstrates the power of TOY. As F omission is bounded by τ , TOY provides lower throughout than the one with F byz . For larger ω bft-SMaRt's scalability affects F byz performance and contrary, the increasing number of workers improves F omission performance. Thus, we observe almost equals results with both F omission and F byz . For larger β the throughput grows thanks to the batching effect. Alas, in practice we observed that for F byz with β = 1000 and large ω, TOP actually produces blocks in an extremely low rate. This happens due to the fact that in our experiment a faulty node is faulty with all of its workers. Recall that while recovering, the nodes are required to Atomic Broadcast a prefix of their blockchain (which may be in the size of a couple of MBs). Thus, in such a case, TOP suffers from long latencies and low throughput for the period of failure. Furthermore, most of the observed throughput is due to the first fault-free 30 seconds of the experiment. This experiment indicates that the optimistic approach of TOY may be the wrong choice for environments where failures are common. 1) TOP in a Geo-Distributed Cluster: In addition to the former benchmarks, we tested TOP in a geodistributed setting with nodes spread around the world. The network's latency that increases in a geo-distributed setting affects WRB's performance and so affects TOP's throughput and latency as well as op b . We tested TOP with the same hardware as before and with the following configurations: n ∈ {4, 7, 10}, 1 ≤ ω ≤ 20, σ = 512, β ∈ {100, 1000} and τ = 20000. The nodes were placed, one node per region, by the following order, in Amazon's N. Virginia, Sau-Paulo, Singapore, Paris, Oregon, London, Sydney, N. California, Central and Ohio data-centers. Figure 12 presents the respective latencies and obtainable bandwidth between these data-centers as measured by the standard iperf and qperf Linux utilities. We tested only the fault free scenario, thus we kept using bft-SMaRt rather than its geo-distributed optimized version named WHEAT [60] . a) TOP's throughput: We tested TOP's throughput in a geo-distributed settings with the above configurations. Each configuration was tested 3 time for 1 minute each. As before, to test the system at high load, a node fills each block to its full capacity with random transactions. The results were collected from all the nodes and we show the average results.
4
(1) 4 (5) 7
(1) 7 (5) 10 (1) 10 (5) 0 Figure 13 shows TOP's throughput in a geo-distributed settings. It can be observed that the lower network's performance dramatically affects TOP's performance. Yet, TOP peaks at around 8K transactions per seconds. TOP peaks under all configurations at 4 MB/sec. According to our measurements, this is on the order of magnitude of the network's bandwidth. Thus it demonstrates again TOP's efficiency. Notice, that while for β = 100, n = 4 obtains the best relative results (as expected), with β = 1000 and high ω we observe an opposite trend and TOP with n = 10 achieves better results than n ∈ {4, 7}. We speculates that this phenomenon is due to the fact that in the geo-distributed settings, losing packets is a common case. Thus, with larger blocks, it is more likely to lose packets, causing the transport layer (TCP/IP) to occupy the CPU with retransmissions. As a result, the earlier observation that the CPU may stay ideal does not hold and TOP faces the limit in which adding workers wrecks performance already with ω ∈ {6, ..., 10}. Yet, with bigger n the proposing round robin takes longer, so the CPU is less loaded, which somewhat postpones this effect. The above can also explain the overall performance's descending that occurs with β = 1000 and ω ≥ 10. b) TOP's Latency: We tested TOP's latency in the geo-distributed settings with the above configurations where ω ∈ {1, 5}. As with the single data-center experiment, we run 9 clients for each node. all configurations, the results' distribution is narrow. This is because here the latency is affected only by the network latency and τ . Also, TOY obtains a latency of less than 12 seconds under all configurations and less than 5 seconds with β = 100. As for higher ω, here the results' distribution is much wider. This is due to the fact that a message may be delayed by at least τ even if a single worker faces the non-optimistic scenario. Notice that with β = 1000, although the average for n = 7 is somewhat better than the one for n = 4, they are still quite close and this may happened due to a period of asynchrony in the network. Also, notice that, as expected, with n = 4 the system has the potential to obtain better latency than any corresponding configuration with n = 7. As before, we depict a breakdown of the latency according to the execution times of the major steps in serving a transaction. The results appear in Figure 15 . The main difference w.r.t. the single data-center case (Figure 9) is that now the tentative-definite step takes roughly half the latency. This can be expected as this step depends on the network latency and bandwidth.
B. Optimizations
TOY on its own does not obtains an extraordinary performance due to its rotating leader paradigm. TOP addresses this issue by running multiple instances of TOY. However, another plausible approach is to disseminate the blocks independently of their headers. Namely, a node disseminates through WRB-broadcast only the block header and votes for delivering only if it received the block itself as well. This method, combined with TOP may achieve hundreds of thousands of transactions per second regardless of the block size. Figures 8, 9 and 14 highlight the main drawback of TOP. Using multiple workers, in a round robin fashion, may impose higher latency even when a single worker delays. Thus, a sharding model in which every worker handles a pre-defined range of possible transaction could alleviate this. Cross shards transactions would then be handled by their own dedicated worker to enforce their total ordering among all nodes.
VIII. DISCUSSION
TOY is a frugal optimistic blockchain algorithm targeting environments where failures rarely occur. For example, TOY is likely to be very attractive for the FinTech industry, which uses highly secure and robust systems. TOY leverages blockchain's iterativity as well as its cryptographic features to achieve its goal.
Loosely speaking, TOP employs TOY as a blockchainbased consensus algorithm rather than consensus-based blockchain. Our performance results show that it matches the requirements of real demanding commercial applications.
In this paper we studied the distributed agreement aspects of TOP/TOY's optimistic approach. In the future, we intend to examine other aspects such as sharding, data model, scalability, and improvement of TOP/TOY's latency. Finally, our prototypes of TOY and TOP are available as open source github projects [7] . ∼Expect the best. Prepare for the worst.∼ Zig Ziglar
